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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to analyze the amount of risk sharing of output that
takes place between regions in Sweden. Using the approach by Asdrubali et al.
(1996), further developed by M´ elitz and Zumer (2002), we ﬁnd that the capital
market is the largest source of risk sharing of gross regional product in Sweden.
Still, roughly 12 percent of a change in regional output is smoothed among the
regions through the ﬁscal system. Taking a closer look at the ﬁscal component,
the results suggest that national taxes play a larger role in the smoothing process
than transfer payments do. There is also some evidence that there are regional
diﬀerences in the sense that regions located in the south rely more on the capital
market as a source of insurance against shocks in output, while the tax and
transfer systems provide a larger extent of risk sharing for regions located in the
north.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The objective of this paper is to analyze the channels and extent of risk shar-
ing (or stabilization, which we will use interchangeably) in regional output
in Sweden. Economic activity does to a large extent take place under un-
certainty where regions may be hit by asymmetric shocks, i.e. some regions
are positively aﬀected by the shocks while others are negatively aﬀected.
One way to mitigate the eﬀect of such shocks is to share the risk within
a group of regions, containing regions which are asymmetrically aﬀected.
The empirical literature has mainly approached the topic of risk sharing
from two diﬀerent angles.1 The ﬁrst approach considers the possibility of
individuals and consumers to diversify regional risk via their consumption
behavior. The other approach considers the presence of a monetary union,
which precludes the use of ﬂexible exchange rates as an instrument for sta-
bilizing economic ﬂuctuations and, thus, leaves it up to ﬁscal mechanisms
and possibly other market institutions to smooth output and consumption
variations. The less integrated the capital market is, the more important
will be the ﬁscal system in providing risk sharing. There is, however, not
necessarily a trade oﬀ between the two. Regardless of which approach we
consider more relevant, it is important to trace the extent of risk sharing.
In modern economies there are usually a wide range of alternatives to
choose between when to insure risk, from regular insurance or insurance via
forward markets where agents act in order to buy and sell commodities at
a ﬁxed price for future delivery. Using US data, Asdrubali et al. (1996)
and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) ﬁnd that the main channel for
spreading risk across regions is via the capital market, by diversifying own-
ership through ex ante investments. Another important mechanism for risk
sharing is provided through national taxes and transfers of the ﬁscal sys-
tem. Most of the empirical literature has, usually due to access to data,
f o c u s e do nt h eﬁscal system as shock absorber. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs
(1992) present results that are similar to those by Asdrubali et al. (1996),
1See von Hagen (1998) for a more thorough overview of the diﬀerent strands of
literature.2
while according to von Hagen (1992), the ﬁscal system plays a more modest
role. Going beyond US borders, Decressin (2002) analyzes redistribution
and risk sharing in Italy, while Buettner (2002) and von Hagen and Hepp
(2001) apply a variant of the approach developed by Asdrubali et al. (1996)
on German data. M´ elitz and Zumer (1999) compare results on data from
the US and Canada with results on data from the UK and Italy, and in a
recent study, M´ elitz and Zumer (2002) also include France. According to
these studies, the stabilization eﬀects in Germany, France and the UK are
approximately at the same level as in the US, whereas there is compara-
tively less risk sharing in Italy and Canada. These results are interesting,
especially considering the fact that both, e.g., Germany and Canada have
extensive transfer systems with the aim to reduce disparities between states
and provinces, i.e., nations with a relatively large extent of redistribution
have a lower extent of risk sharing provided by the ﬁscal system.2
The diﬀerences in results have been debated, and one factor that has
been addressed as underlying these diﬀerences concern the use of levels as
opposed to ﬁrst diﬀerences in order to distinguish between risk sharing and
redistribution. Another factor concerns the accounting of data, especially
transfers. Hence, the debate and the fact that there is still no consensus
in the results, makes risk sharing a highly interesting topic. Since previ-
ous work has found that international risk sharing is limited (Sørensen and
Yosha, 1998), it is especially interesting to analyze various types of na-
tional institutional systems. This paper contributes with empirical evidence
on output risk sharing in the somewhat diﬀerent institutional structure of
Scandinavian ﬁscal federalism, here represented by Sweden.3 In line with,
e.g., Germany and Canada, Sweden has an extensive system of intergovern-
2Evaluating the equalization system in Canada, Boadway and Hayashi (2004) ﬁnd
that the system contains destabilizing elements, which may generate more variability in
revenue of the provinces than would be the case in the absence of the equalization system.
3In Sweden, the size of the public sector is, in an international comparison, very large.
The provision of many services, such as child care, education and health care, has been
decentralized to the subnational level. The national government tries to monitor the lower
levels of government via legislation as well as via the intergovernmental transfer system.
The main source of revenue for the local governments is income taxation.3
mental transfers aimed at equalizing ﬁscal disparities between counties and
municipalities, respectively. In addition, our data set allows us to estimate
smoothing due to agents holding assets on the ﬁnancial markets. Hence, we
are able to conduct a broader analysis of the importance of the institutional
platform. During the time period of study, the tax and transfer systems were
subject to major changes and the ﬁnancial markets were deregulated, which
makes it possible to analyze whether these reforms have had any impact
on the extent to which the capital market and the ﬁscal system stabilize
output variation among regions. Further, we also test for the possibility
that Swedish regions belong to diﬀerent risk sharing groups, which previous
results on Swedish income data suggest is the case (Andersson, 2004).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model.
The scope is to combine the empirical speciﬁcations suggested by Asdrubali
et al. (1996) and M´ elitz and Zumer (2002), which facilitates a way to mea-
sure the extent to which the capital market and the ﬁscal system, respec-
tively, mitigate the inﬂuence of a shock to output. This is done by estimating
the correlation between the variation in gross regional product and net factor
income and net taxes, respectively. The analysis is carried out on a panel of
Swedish regions for the period 1985-2000. Section 3 contains a description
of the data set. The results are also presented in Section 3. The paper
concludes with Section 4.
2 The empirical model
In the empirical literature there are several suggestions regarding how to
capture the risk-sharing components of changes in regional income. By fur-
ther developing the approach by Asdrubali et al. (1996), M´ elitz and Zumer





where X is gross regional product, while Y i sg r o s sp r o d u c tm i n u si n c o m e .
This can be decomposed into one part which captures redistribution eﬀects
Y i = α
r + β
rXi + ηi (1)4
and another part
Yit = αi + β
sXit + µit (2)
which refers to stabilization eﬀects; αi = Y i − βsXi. Focusing on equation
(2), βs = 1 indicates that there is full risk sharing, since the variation in gross
product is fully reﬂected in Y , and not in income itself. This means that a
change in gross regional product is fully absorbed by capital and/or ﬁscal
institutions, which leaves income after risk sharing unaﬀected. However, if
βs = 0, there is no pass-through in the system, i.e. the variation in gross
product is reﬂected in income and not in Y , which suggests that there is no
risk sharing. In other words, βs indicates the extent of risk sharing. Taking
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of equation (2) gives us
∆Yit = δi + β
s∆Xit + µit (3)
where we allow for a regional term δi, which captures possible drift elements
of the disturbance term (M´ elitz and Zumer, 2002).
In this paper we are interested in decomposing equation (3) into risk
sharing that takes place via the capital market and the ﬁscal system, re-
spectively. Asdrubali et al. (1996) shows that this is feasible by realizing
that according to standard accounting, regional product (X) minus personal
income (PI) is net factor income, i.e. net income received from other regions
by for instance holding assets. In turn, personal income (PI) minus dispos-
able income (DPI) is net taxes, i.e. net contribution to the ﬁscal system.
Hence, the correlation between the variation in gross regional product and
n e tf a c t o ri n c o m e ,βs
K, indicates to what extent the capital market is in-
volved in stabilizing a shock to output. In the same manner, the correlation
between the variation in gross regional product and net taxes, βs
F,i n d i c a t e s
the amount of risk sharing that is provided by the ﬁscal system. Estimates
of βs
K and βs
F are obtained by estimating the following equations
∆(Xit − PI it)=dK,i + β
s
K∆Xit +  it (4)
∆(PI it − DPIit)=dF,i + β
s
F∆Xit + εit
Due to the decomposition, note that 1 = βs
K +βs
F +βs
U, i.e. the total shock5
can be stabilized by the capital market (βs
K)a n d / o rt h eﬁscal system (βs
F),
while βs
U represents the part of the shock that remains unexplained by our
model and which may be unsmoothed. It is important to realize that even
in the case of full risk sharing, regions may be aﬀected by national shocks.
We deal with this by dividing the variables by the aggregate (national) per
capita value for the respective variables.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
The Swedish public sector is structured into three levels of government; local
governments (municipalities), regional governments (counties) and the cen-
tral or national government. The municipalities provide a variety of services
such as child care, education and care of the elderly, while the counties’
main responsibility is health care. The central government is mainly re-
sponsible for the provision of national public goods, such as the defense,
and redistribution.
The data set is a panel covering the period 1985-2001 and 21 regions.
The 21 regions consist of a total of 289 municipalities, where the number of
municipalities in the regions vary between 1, since the county and municipal-
ity of Gotland coincide, and 51 in the county of V¨ astra G¨ otaland. We also
note that there is a large diﬀerence in density between regions, where the
county of Stockholm has a density of 240.5 inhabitants per square kilometer
while the density in Norrbotten county is 2.5. Data originate from national
accounts data and the income-tax returns ﬁled by individuals, which have
been aggregated to regional level. All monetary values have been deﬂated
by the consumer price index (1980 = 100), and are divided by population
to calculate per capita values.
The income variable used in the analysis is the average real income among
all municipal residents, including legal persons, assessable for national tax
measured as total personal income (employment income and income of busi-
ness), minus general deductions and deductions for loss. Similarly, the tax6
payment variable is measured as the real per capita personal tax payment
to the national government by residents in the municipality, including em-
ployment income tax, capital income tax, property tax, tax on real estate,
and social security.
The central government distributes transfers to the lower levels of govern-
ments in the form of grant-in-aid, operating grants and investment grants.
National transfers to the households made up about 20 percent of the na-
tional budget in the beginning of the 1980s and about 30 percent at the end
of the 1990s. These transfers consist of child allowances, housing allowances,
pension, sickness beneﬁts, study allowances, unemployment beneﬁts, and so-
cial allowances. The transfer variable used in the analysis is measured as
the real per capita transfer payments distributed by the central government
to the municipalities, counties, and the households as listed above.
Gross regional product is not available prior to 1985, which puts a lim-
iting constraint on the length of the time period. In addition, the national
account system was subject to a major change in 1993. According to Sta-
tistics Sweden, it is not possible to link data for the entire time period. For
the year 1993, gross regional product has been calculated according to both
the old and new account systems. We therefore estimate the equations using
the time periods 1985-1993 and 1993-2001, respectively.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
Generally, there is larger variation between regions in the later period 1993-
2001 compared to the period 1985-1993. The county of Stockholm reports
the highest output and income per capita, while we note that the lowest
value of gross regional product and income per capita are registered for the
counties of S¨ odermanland and Gotland, respectively. The highest value of
national tax payments per capita is registered for Stockholm, which also
receives the least transfer payments per capita. This pattern applies to both
time periods. The island of Gotland has the lowest tax payment per capita
in both time periods. The counties of J¨ amtland and Gotland have received
highest amounts of transfer payments.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE7
3.2 Results
We present the results of panel data estimation methods using regional ﬁxed
eﬀects (FE; within estimator) and generalized least squares (GLS).4 All esti-
mations assume a common AR1 process for all regions.5 In the GLS estima-
tions we allow for a heteroskedastic error structure, but no cross-sectional
correlation.6 Since the literature has argued both in favor of using levels and
ﬁrst diﬀerences to estimate the extent of risk sharing, we will show results of
both procedures in order to to see whether the results diﬀer. Tables 2 and
3 present the results when using levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences, respectively, to
estimate (4).
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
According to Table 2, and the FE estimations, the capital market smooth-
ing amounts to approximately 82 percent, while the GLS estimations suggest
a more moderate absorption of 59 percent in the earlier period, 1985-1993.
Further, the smoothing is about 20 percentage points lower in the latter
period 1993-2001, which is true for both estimation methods. Using ﬁxed
eﬀects we ﬁnd that the ﬁscal system picks up about 7 percent of a shock to
gross regional product, while the GLS estimations put more weight on the
ﬁscal system in providing risk sharing.
T u r n i n gt ot h er e s u l t so fﬁrst diﬀerences in Table 3, we see that the
r e s u l t sf o rt h ec a p i t a lm a r k e ta r em o r es t a b l eo v e rt i m e . T h ed i ﬀerence
4The model has also been estimated with random eﬀects, where the results are similar
to those obtained using GLS. A Hausman speciﬁcation test shows that the ﬁxed eﬀects
model is preferred to the random eﬀects model.
5The econometric software STATA is used to estimate the parameters. The following
estimator of ρ is used: ρtscorr =  t−1/ ,w h e r e is the vector of residuals and t−1
the vector of lagged residuals. Testing for serial correlation, we ﬁnd evidence of an AR1
structure in the disturbances in both time periods using ﬁrst diﬀerenced data, but only
in the second time period when using levels.
6Since the time-series dimension is rather short in comparison with the number of
cross-sections (each panel contains 9 years and 21 counties), it is not possible to correct
for potential cross-sectional correlation.8
between the two estimation methods as well as the diﬀerence between using
levels or ﬁrst diﬀerences is most pronounced for smoothing provided by the
capital market. In the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, we ﬁnd that the share of the
capital market has increased from 73 percent to 86 percent between the two
time periods, while the GLS estimation suggests a more moderate increase
in absorption of approximately 1.5 percentage points to a high of 76 percent
in the later time period. In the second part or the 1980s, the Swedish capital
and currency markets were deregulated. Since it usually takes time before
a previously regulated market becomes fully integrated, it is reasonable to
expect the importance of the capital market in providing risk sharing to
increase with time. The results in Table 3 support this expectation.
Looking at the extent of risk sharing provided by the ﬁscal system, the
ﬁxed eﬀects estimates show that it picks up approximately 12 percent of a
shock to output. The tax and transfer systems were subject to major changes
in the beginning of the 1990s. In 1991 a major tax reform was implemented,
and then in 1993 the transfer system underwent major changes. According
to the results using ﬁxed eﬀects presented in Table 3, βs
F is not signiﬁcant
in the second time period, which suggests that the ﬁscal system does not
provide any insurance against a shock to output after the implementation
of the new tax and transfer systems. Though, the GLS estimates indicate
that there still is a small extent of smoothing even though it is somewhat
smaller than before the reforms.
In line with M` elitz and Zumer (2002), Swedish county level data for the
period 1985-2001, show that using personal income data put much more
weight on the ﬁscal system than the gross regional product data do. In this
case, 21 percent of a change in personal income is smoothed by the ﬁscal
system, which may be compared to the results presented in Tables 2 and 3.
The smoothing provided by the central government can be decomposed
into eﬀects of tax payments and transfer payments.7 The results presented
in Table 4 indicate that taxes play a larger role in the smoothing process
7Using equation (1), the redistributional eﬀect between regions of the tax and transfer
systems is approximately 32 percent for the period 1985-1993 and 34 percent for the
period 1993-2001.9
than transfers do. This is consistent for both time periods, regardless of
estimation model.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Experiments with personal income data by M´ elitz and Zumer (2002)
show that the estimation results on the extent of stabilization tend to be
biased towards one when the time-series is short. In order to check the
sensitivity of the results with respect to this matter, we re-run the regressions
treating the periods 1985-1993 and 1993-2001 as one time period, i.e. 1985-
2001, and thereby neglecting the re-classiﬁcation of the national account
system discussed in the previous section, as well as neglecting any potential
parameter instability due to the reforms of the tax and transfer systems.8
The FE estimates of βs
F shows statistical diﬀerences between treating data
as two separate panels or as one, when using ﬁrst diﬀerences. This is also
true for the estimation of βs
K when using levels. All GLS estimates in levels
are statistically diﬀerent when treating data as originating from one time-
series compared to dividing data into two separate time periods. In all other
cases, the length of the time-series does not eﬀect the estimated parameter
values. However, it is important to keep in mind that this exercise is only
made for expositional purpose and is not a rigorous test of the importance
of the length of the time-series.
Previous results on Swedish income data show that are are regional dif-
ferences regarding the extent of smoothing of a change in personal income
that is provided by the ﬁscal system in Sweden (Andersson, 2004). Unfortu-
nately, we do not have access to output data on the local (municipality) level,
which would facilitate a full analysis of regional diﬀerences. However, it is
often considered the case that the behavior of the regions in the north and
8The following estimates (standard deviations are given within parentheses) of βs
K
and βs
F are obtained for the time period 1985-2001. Using ﬁxed eﬀects and levels,
βs
K =0 .705(0.045), βs
F =0 .069(0.015), while taking ﬁrst diﬀerences produce the fol-
lowing estimates: βs
K =0 .784(0.056), βs
F =0 .060(0.019). In the same manner we ﬁnd the
following results using GLS. In the case of levels βs
K =0 .538(0.041), βs
F =0 .107(0.017),
a n di nt h ec a s eo fﬁrst diﬀerences βs
K =0 .752(0.043), βs
F =0 .040(0.013).10
south part of Sweden is diﬀerent, and, therefore, we test for the possibility
that they belong to diﬀerent risk sharing groups.9
Concentrating on the use of ﬁrst diﬀerences, the results are presented in
Table 5. Both the FE and the GLS estimates show that the capital market
is more dominant in smoothing a shock to output in regions located in the
s o u t ht h a ni nn o r t h e r nr e g i o n s .T h es o u t hp a r to fS w e d e ni sa ne c o n o m i c a l l y
larger region with a more diversiﬁed business structure than the north. If
all regions are well integrated in the sense that capital is equally mobile
across Sweden, then the capital market would also be equally important as
a source of stabilization for both the north and the south. Apparently this
is not the case in practise. One possible explanation for this result is that
a large share of the production that is carried out in the northern regions
have their headquarters and stock owners located in the south, while the
opposite is rarely the case. So, this, in combination with a more diversiﬁed
business structure in the south, could explain why the capital market is
more dominant as a smoothing component for the south than for the north.
Further, the results indicate that the ﬁscal system is a more important source
of stabilization for northern regions than regions in the south. This supports
the notion that if access to well-integrated capital markets is limited, the
importance of the ﬁscal system as a source of stabilization becomes more
pronounced.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
So, how does the Swedish institutional system compare with institutional
systems of other countries? Using data on the US and Canada, M´ elitz and
Zumer (2002) are able to compare the importance of the tax-transfer systems
in stabilizing a shock to gross output. The authors ﬁnd that stabilization
amounts to approximately 13 percent in Canada and 12 percent in the US,
which is in the neighborhood of the results presented in this paper, at least
9Northern regions include the counties of G¨ avleborg, V¨ asternorrland, J¨ amtland,
V¨ asterbotten and Norrbotten, while southern regions include the counties of Stock-
h o l m ,U p p s a l a ,S ¨ odermanland, ¨ Osterg¨ otland, J¨ onk¨ oping, Kronoberg, Kalmar, Gotland,
Blekinge, Sk˚ ane, V¨ astra G¨ otaland, V¨ armland, ¨ Orebro, V¨ astmanland, and Dalarna.11
for the period 1985-1993. However, allowing for regional diﬀerences, it ap-
p e a r sa si fﬁscal stabilization varies between approximately 8 and 25 percent
in Sweden. Further, and interestingly enough, the results presented in this
paper indicate that the capital market partakes to a greater extent in sta-
bilizing a shock to output in Sweden than is the case in the US (see results
by Asdrubali et al., 1996; Athanasoulis and van Wincoop, 2001). Thus, it
appears as if the institutional system does play a role for the amount of
stabilization that the regions can rely upon in the case of an asymmetric
shock to output.
4 Concluding remarks
The objective of this paper is to analyze the amount of risk sharing of
output that takes place between regions in Sweden. Using the approach by
Asdrubali et al. (1996), further developed by M´ elitz and Zumer (2002), we
ﬁnd that the capital market is the largest source of risk sharing of gross
regional product in Sweden. Still, roughly 12 percent of a change in regional
output is smoothed among the regions through the ﬁscal system. Taking a
closer look at the ﬁscal component, the results suggest that national taxes
play a larger role in the smoothing process than transfer payments do. There
is also some evidence that there are regional diﬀerences in the sense that
regions located in the south rely more on the capital market as a source
of insurance against shocks in output while the tax and transfer systems
provide a larger extent of risk sharing for regions located in the north. The
results also suggest that the changes made in the tax and transfer systems
in the beginning of the 1990s and the deregulation of the ﬁnancial markets
have shifted towards an even larger extent of stabilization through the capital
market as opposed to the ﬁscal system (the overall amount of risk sharing
is relatively stable over time).12
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Table 1: Summary statistics, real per capita values in SEK, 1985-1993,
1993-2001
1985-1993 1993-2001
Mean Std.d Mean Std.d
Gross regional product 69,108 6,031 77,141 11,225
Income 46,022 5,458 50,834 8,073
Taxes 3,990 1,590 5,605 2,501
Transfers 3,358 1,212 5,826 1,198
Note: Real per capita values. In 1980-prices.
Table 2: Stabilization of gross regional product in Sweden; levels and loga-
rithms
FE GLS










Coeﬃcient 0.823 0.066 0.605 0.067 0.586 0.115 0.354 0.187
Std.d 0.067 0.022 0.064 0.020 0.061 0.028 0.047 0.020
R2 0.507 0.057 0.377 0.073
ρ 0.370 0.132 0.276 0.352 0.675 0.737 0.553 0.683
Log L 457.99 595.56 407.08 575.34
Note: Regional constants are included in the regressions. Estimations
include a common AR1 process for all panels.15
Table 3: Stabilization of gross regional product in Sweden; 1st diﬀerences
and logarithms
FE GLS










Coeﬃcient 0.732 0.123 0.858 0.014 0.736 0.048 0.760 0.034
Std.d 0.082 0.035 0.090 0.026 0.055 0.020 0.053 0.017
R2 0.389 0.091 0.419 0.002
ρ -0.328 -0.476 -0.328 -0.426 -0.252 -0.361 -0.299 -0.331
Log L 453.12 617.37 408.68 607.12
Note: Regional constants are included in the regressions. Estimations
include a common AR1 process for all panels.
Table 4: Components of stabilization of gross regional product in Sweden
by the central government; logarithms
FE GLS
1985-1993 1993-2001 1985-1993 1993-2001
Coeﬀ Std.d Coeﬀ Std.d Coeﬀ Std.d Coeﬀ Std.d
Levels
Transfers 0.024 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.023 0.011 0.071 0.011
Taxes 0.034 0.019 0.073 0.014 0.100 0.016 0.121 0.011
1st diﬀerences
Transfers 0.024 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.008
Taxes 0.105 0.030 0.010 0.020 0.031 0.018 0.036 0.012
Note: Regional constants are included in the regressions.
Estimations include a common AR1 process for all panels.16
Table 5: Stabilization of gross regional product in Sweden allowing for dif-
ferent regional patterns; 1st diﬀerences and logarithms
FE GLS











Coeﬃcient 0.498 0.250 0.606 0.083 0.570 0.101 0.643 0.061
Std.d 0.126 0.077 0.200 0.038 0.094 0.041 0.116 0.033
R2 0.352 0.267 0.241 0.071
ρ -0.162 -0.550 -0.412 -0.418 -0.160 -0.462 -0.358 -0.335
Log L 112.14 145.27 97.42 145.91
South
Coeﬃcient 0.818 0.083 0.907 -0.00003 0.797 0.031 0.810 0.031
Std.d 0.100 0.038 0.102 0.029 0.066 0.023 0.060 0.019
R2 0.415 0.048 0.455 0.000
ρ -0.353 -0.442 -0.305 -0.424 -0.268 -0.324 -0.284 -0.340
Log L 343.09 474.54 312.56 462.91
Note: Regional constants are included in the regressions. Estimations
include a common AR1 process for all panels.